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Attacked positions
The argument to be presented is not relevant to all sub-
positions of scientific realism; it does not concern
• Plain scientific realism which states that our best mature 
scientific theories are true with respect to the postulated 
theoretical entities and their properties
• Entity realism  in which manipulability is the main 
resource for claims to reality
• All forms of structural realism that either bracket the 
general defense of realism or do not use the “structural 
continuity claim” in its defense
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Attacked positions (2)
The argument presented in this paper concerns
• Convergent scientific realism about entities 
(CSRE)
• All forms of structural realism (SR) that base their 
plausibility on the “structural continuity claim”
• Any form of realism about X that bases its 
plausibility on the continuous presence of X in a 
sequence of theories (e.g., X = properties)
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Convergent scientific realism about 
entities (CSRE)
CSRE consists of two core assumptions:
1. Accepted mature scientific theories are 
approximately true, which means in particular that 
the theoretical entities postulated  by them really 
exist (e.g., electrons, quarks, fields, big bang, 
selection pressures, continental plates, etc.)
2. Scientific statements about the properties of these 
unobservable entities become more and more 
accurate in the course of scientific development
5
CSRE (2)
The following assumption is optional, although it 
is part of the name “convergent scientific 
realism about entities”:
3. Scientific theories converge to a true theory in 
the course of scientific development
The argument to be presented is independent of 
whether or not assumption 3 is included
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Main arguments for CSRE
Since the 17th century, there is an undisputed 
successive improvement of  scientific theories 
with respect to their empirical performance
This progress is interpreted in the sense of CSRE 
for the following two reasons:
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Main arguments for CSRE (cont.)
1. In most cases, theoretical objects introduced into 
modern science stay there (exceptions can be 
explained away); this may be called the “entity 
continuity claim”
2. The miracle argument: only CSRE explains why 
science achieves use-novel predictions
“use-novel predictions” of a theory: theoretical 
predictions of phenomena that were not used in 
the construction of the theory
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Structural realism (SR)
Historically, SR goes back to the early 20th century
More recent discussion begins in 1989 with a paper by John 
Worrall: “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”
SR concedes a very common counter-argument against CSRE 
which denies the “entity continuity claim”: scientific 
revolutions drastically change entities 
Entities are thus inappropriate candidates for a realist 
interpretation of scientific theories
Instead, SR proposes structures that are somehow more 
continuous through historical change of theories than entities
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SR (2)
SR comes in two variants (Holger Lyre, 2010):
• “French-Ladyman-type” approach: no defense of SR in 
general, but straightforward application to physics
Not further considered in this paper
• “Worrall-type” approach: defense of SR mainly by the 
“structural continuity claim” (Ioannis Votsis, 2011):
Later theories incorporate the mathematical structure of earlier 
theories as shown, for instance, by the limit relations between 
them
Thus, there is a historically stable structural core in physical 
theories which is interpreted as reflecting reality’s structure
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Difficulties with theory 
convergence to the truth
Theory convergence to a true theory (optional assumption 
3) presupposes
1. A theory space which contains all approximately true 
theories (the true limit theory itself does not have to 
be within this space)
2. An appropriate metric on the theory space measuring 
the distance of a given theory from the true theory
3. A way to identify convergence of a sequence of 
theories of which only a finite number is known, and  
the limit theory is unknown
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Difficulties with theory 
convergence to the truth (2)
The easiest way out of these difficulties is to drop the 
assumption that the sequence of theories converges to 
the truth
Thus, in order to defend realism one may only use the  
“entity continuity claim” or the “structural continuity 
claim”, or any “X continuity claim”, respectively, 
without explicitly claiming convergence of the 
sequence of theories
Basic idea: What is stable through progressive scientific 
development qualifies as candidate  for being real 
This is an abductive argument
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The impasse objection
The impasse objection exploits the principal weakness of 
the abductive argument
It is directed against CSRE and Worrall-type SR, both with or 
without a convergence claim regarding the sequence of 
theories
Let a sequence of empirically progressive theories with 
“entity continuity”, or “structural continuity”, or “X 
continuity” be given
The things that survive the historical change, especially 
scientific revolutions, are the candidates for the realist 
interpretation (entities, structures, or Xs)
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The impasse objection (2)
Imagine now that the respective continuity in the sequence 
of theories is due to its convergence to a certain limit 
theory – this is logically possible (in spite of the 
difficulties mentioned regarding the convergence of 
theories)
The realist is forced to claim that the limit theory is at least 
approximately true (whether she is sympathetic with 
the existence of a limit theory is irrelevant)
However, it must be excluded that the limit theory is a 
fundamentally false theory that is capable of making 
very accurate predictions – this would be an impasse
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The impasse objection (3)
“Fundamentally false”:
• for CSRE: some of the limit theory’s theoretical entities are 
radically different from the real entities, i.e., some 
theoretical terms of the limit theory do not refer
• for SR: the limit theory’s structure do not  even 
approximately represent nature’s true structure
“Very accurate predictions”: imagine that the limit theory’s 
predictions are correct with a relative accuracy of 10-100
It seems that the existence this kind of limit theory, i.e., this sort 
of impasse cannot be excluded
In this case, the existence of continuity in the sequence of 
theories does not justify their realistic interpretation
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Objection 1: the miracle argument
Following the miracle argument, it would be a miracle if 
the limit theory with a relative predictive accuracy of  
10-100 was fundamentally false
Therefore, it is extremely likely that the limit theory is 
at least approximately true
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Objection 1 (cont.)
Counter-objection:
In its only possibly defensible form, the miracle argument 
states that theories that produce use-novel predictions
may be interpreted realistically
We do not know whether the limit theory produces use-
novel predictions; nothing of this sort follows from its 
properties
Therefore, the miracle argument does not help to establish 
that the limit theory is at least approximately true – it 
does not eliminate the impasse objection
17
Objection 2: general skepticism
The impasse objection presents only a logical possibility 
and is not a serious argument; it derives from a 
fundamentally skeptical stance
Fundamental skepticism is always a logical possibility 
and cannot be refuted
However, fundamental skepticism is sterile and should 
be dismissed
Therefore, the impasse objection should be dismissed
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Objection 2 (cont.)
Counter-objection: 
The impasse objection does not derive from 
fundamental skepticism
It has the form of an absolutely normal mathematical 
argument: If someone claims that some 
mathematical object o has property F, I can challenge 
this claim by demonstrating that o may have 
property non-F
o: converging sequence of theories
F: limit theory is at least approximately true
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Objection 3: burden of proof
It is not the (CSRE or SR) realist who has to show 
that the limit theory is at least approximately 
true
On the contrary, the opponent has to establish 
that the limit theory is not at least 
approximately true
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Objection 3 (cont.)
Counter-objection: The realist has to claim something more 
specific than the opponent, namely that the limit theory 
is at least approximately true, whereas the opponent 
only claims that it is either approximately true or 
radically false
The more specific claim must be argued
Example: I claim that the limit of some converging sequence 
is between 2 and 4, and you claim that the limit is 3
You must argue that the limit is 3
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Result
The core argument for both CSRE and SR is the 
continuity of some aspect (entities, structures, or Xs) 
in the historical sequence of theories
However, this continuity could be produced by a 
fundamentally false but empirically very accurate 
limit theory
Therefore, the continuity of some aspect in the 
historical sequence of theories is not a reliable sign 
of their representing something real, and does thus 
not support the respective realism
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